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ABSTRACT
This study examined 182 ramp operations incident reports from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
database, to determine which factors influence ramp operation incidents. It was found that incidents occurred more
often during aircraft arrival operations than during departure operations; incidents occurred most often at the gate
stop area, less so at the gate entry/exit areas, and least on the ramp fringe areas; and reporters cited fewer incidents
when more ground crew were present. The authors offer suggestions for both airline management and flight crews
to reduce the rate of ramp incidents.
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Airport ramp safety has been given much attention recently in reports and papers by organizations including the
Flight Safety Foundation, International Society of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI), the United Kingdom Flight
Safety Committee (UKFSC) and the Airports Association Council International (AACI). In spite of the efforts put
forth by safety organizations and air carrier safety departments, damage to aircraft and ground equipment, and injury
to ground personnel continue to occur during ramp operations. In addition to the human hazard posed by these
incidents, they also incur a substantial operating cost. A speaker at a recent UKFSC seminar states the equipment
damage and loss worldwide as the dollar equivalent of fifteen Boeing 747-400s. 2
During the period 1986-1994, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) received almost 1,000 reports
describing ramp operations incidents and the human factors that contributed to these events. A detailed examination
of ASRS database reports was undertaken to further identify the major types of damage and areas of risk in ramp
operations, and the flight crew and ground crew performance errors that contributed to these events.
OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
Objectives
Specific research objectives were as follows:
• Identify the area of operations in which damage is most likely to occur: ramp entry or exit area, gate entry
or exit area, or gate stop area.
• Determine the kinds of damages that occur and their causes.
• Assess the role of environmental factors such as lighting, ramp markings, and surface conditions.
• Assess the role of ground equipment positioning and operations problems in ramp incidents.
• Identify the flight crew and ground crew performance errors that contribute to ramp incidents.
• Recormnend enhancements to current ramp procedures to reduce the number of ramp incidents.
Scope
Initial data retrieval included 373 reports from all types of aviation operations. Specific screening criteria were
used to review each report for its relevance to the study objectives. To be included in the final study set, an
incident had to meet each of the following criteria: 1) involve a ramp operation of an FAR 121 or 135 aircraft or a
2-crew corporate aircraft; 2) reference damage to aircraft or ground equipment, or injury to flight or ground personnel
or passengers; and 3) directly involve the flight crew (that is, the flight crew occupied the cockpit at the time of the
incident, and their actions or inactions may have contributed to the incident). The research team applied the
screening criteria listed above to the initial report set, and selected 182 reports as a final study set. Other types of
ramp safety incidents were considered beyond the scope of this study.
1 Captain Roy Chamberlin has bccn an ASRS analyst for six years. Hc has eight years experience as a military pilot and 33 years with a major
air carrier. He has flown a wide variety of aircraft, and has logged over 24,000 hours. Charles Drew has 8,000 hours of flight time from his
18 years as a corporate pilot and Chicf Pilot for a Part 135 operator. He is qualified in a wide rangc of aircraft, including several large
corporate-type jets. Mr. Drew is the founding Editor ofASRS Directline, and has been with ASRS for six years. Marcia Patten is a technical
writer and editor for BattelIe/ASRS. She is a commercial pilot and certified flight instructor in helicopters, and has eight years experience in
helicopter air taxi operations. Robert Matchette has I I years experience in general aviation, corporate, and air carrier operations, most
recently as First Officer on Boeing 727s for transoceanic cargo flights. He has logged more than 5,700 hours in a variety of aircraft. Mr.
Matchenc has been an ASRS analyst for two years.
2 This damage esti,natc was cited in the closing remarks by Harry Hopkins, the former chairman of the United Kingdom Flight Safety
Committee (UKFSC), at the commiuec's annual seminar held in November, 1994. The focus of the 1994 seminar was "Ramp Accidcnts: The
Problem, the Kcy, and the Cure."
"Taxiing to the fight of the taxi line...marshaler was on FO's side.., lighting was poor...a truck was adjacent to
another truck...I felt I had at least 3 feet of wing tip clearance...[then] I could see the wing tip coming off file
back of thc truck...the marshaler was still giving me straight ahead..." (ASRS Report No. 258353)
Improper positioning of ground equipment. Reporters stated that ground equipment was sometimes parked
outside its marked areas and encroached on aircraft movement areas. Some reporters also noted that aircraft support
vehicles approached the aircraft before it had stopped and the crew had given a signal (usually by turning off the
aircraft's rotating beacon).
Improper taxi or parking instructions. Although not specifically related to ground crew performance, taxi lines,
stop lines, and lead-in lights were also cited as contributing factors to incidents. Some reporters specifically
recormnended making the wingwalker position mandatory for all ramp operations, to supplement the mechanical
systems.
In 24% of the reports, parking guidance was cited as an issue related to ramp congestion. The combination of
ramp congestion and lack of staffing were the precursors to this Captain's experience of hitting a cargo loader:
"...returned to the gate...single marshaler...we had just passed through some congested areas on the other side of
the airport and figured we had had practice at judging how close things were to the wing tip...misplaced
confidence..." (ASRS Report No. 201610)
Flight Crew Performance Issues. Many flight crew members referenced difficulty in seeing poorly-maintained paint
lines and poorly-placed light systems used for self-parking as contributing to incidents. Others reports referenced
the crew's inability to accurately judge whether ground equipment was parked outside tile aircraft movement area.
Other incident precursors mentioned by flight crews included:
• Distraction by cockpit duties, ATC or company communications, checklists, or fatigue;
• Failure to use adequate cockpit coordination skills;
• Inappropriate response to schedule pressure or demand for on-time performance;
• Continuation of an operation even when something didn't look right, or was blatantly wrong;
• Failure to request a tug to get into or out of a tight parking place.
Communications Issues. Reporters were receiving some sort of ramp guidance--verbal, visual, or both--in 79% of
the incidents. Reporters stated that they were using visual corrununication (hand signals, taxi lines, or guide light
systems) in 61% of the reported incidents, and verbal communication (with ATC, company ramp control, or ramp
personnel) in 24% of the incidents. The low incidence of verbal communications might be notable, except that in
36% of the reports, reporters indicated that verbal communication was not required in the operation. Overall,
however, 52% of the reporters stated that the communication---either verbal or visual--with the guidance personnel
was poor.
Procedural Issues. Air carrier operational procedures were reported as contributory in 34% of the incidents. Some
reports cited instances of a crew's failure to follow such established policies or procedures as use of checklists, use
of salutes, a verbal statement of"clear right," and other basic operational procedures. Other reports referenced a lack
of established procedure. Reporters offered suggestions for filling the gap-for example, that simulator training of
ramp operations and pushback procedures be instituted for pilots, and that both flight crews and ground crews be
exposed to parallel training (that is, each group receiving the same information and training that is provided for the
other). Parallel training would promote a clearer understanding of each other's responsibilities and expectations
during ramp and gate operations. In the following report, a towing procedure, new to the flight crew, paved the way
for a ramp incident:
"Tow crew did not follow their checklist (unknown to us that they even had one for that situation), and did not
challenge us to switch off hydraulic pressure to nosewheel. We overlooked it (new situation, no checklist or
SOP for it). Result was broken tow bar connection to nosewheel." (ASRS Report No. 264610)
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REDUCING RAMP OPERATION INCIDENTS
There are a number of actions that air carrier management can take to reduce ramp incidents. The following
recommendations are based on the findings presented above and on suggestions from a panel of highly-experienced
ASRS analysts:
• Provide additional scenario-based training for ground crews, using some of the incident reports available from
the ASRS database;
